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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lonnie Johnson was convicted by a jury of grand theft by possession of stolen 
property. The value used for the determination of the grade of the offense was the 
purported replacement value for brand new copper wires. The State presented no 
evidence that the market value for the wires actually taken could not be satisfactorily 
ascertained, nor did the State present evidence that the replacement cost proffered was 
of a similar quality, design and value of the wire alleged to have been stolen -wire that 
was possibly over one hundred years old. The district court entered a restitution order 
upon Mr. Johnson's conviction for $2,000, or the approximate value of the replacement 
cost for new wires as testified to by one of the State's witnesses at trial. 
Mr. Johnson timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence and 
asserts: (1) that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in this case; 
(2) that the jury was improperly instructed, and that the district court's jury instructions 
relieved the State of its burden of proof as to some of the material elements of the 
offense, thereby resulting in fundamental error; (3) that the district court erred, and 
violated Mr. Johnson's constitutional rights to compulsory process and to present an 
adequate defense, when the court completely excluded one of the defense witnesses 
as a sanction for a discovery violation; (4) that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
that rose to the level of a fundamental error; (5) that the district court erred when it 
awarded restitution in the amount of $2,000; and (6) under the cumulative error 
doctrine, the multitude of errors in this case require reversal of Mr. Johnson's conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Dan Milovanovic, an officer with the Union Pacific Railroad, received a 
call that some signal wires used by the railroad appeared to have been stolen. 
(Tr., p.119, Ls.3-9; p.124, Ls.1-4.) When he arrived at the location, near Dietrich, Idaho, 
he could see that some of the wires were cut and hanging down from the poles to which 
they were attached. (Tr., p.124, Ls.9-20.) Officer Milovanovic also saw a pile of cut 
train signal wires on the ground that were readily observable because of the bright 
green patina on the wire. (Tr., p.124, Ls.16-20.) 
Next to the pile of wires was a tee shirt that had the initials "L.J." printed inside of 
the collar. (Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.1.) As the officer continued to look around the 
area, he also found a plastic bag that contained garbage. (Tr., p.125, Ls.8-15.) In 
addition to the garbage, however, the bag also contained two receipts from Pacific Steel 
and Recycling for the sale of copper. (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-20.) Lonnie Johnson's name 
was on these receipts. (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-20.) 
After collecting several items from the scene, Officer Milovanovic then went to 
Pacific Steel and Recycling to conduct further investigation. (Tr., p.139, L.25 - p.140, 
L.3.) He was able to identify what appeared to be signal wire used by Union Pacific in 
one of the bins for scrap metal. (Tr., p.142, Ls.2-10.) An employee at the recycling 
center also gave Officer Milovanovic a copy of receipts from sales that Mr. Johnson had 
previously made at the center. (Tr, p.142, L . l l  - p.143, L.4.) According to Officer 
Milovanovic's testimony at trial, he was able to identify the signal wire from Union 
Pacific due to its gauge and because the wire was aged and covered in "old fiber tar 
insulation." (Tr., p.144, L.2 - p.147, L.17.) 
After Officer Milovanovic completed his investigation at Pacific Steel and 
Recycling, he participated in Mr. Johnson's arrest. (Tr., p.152, L.10 - p.153, L.lO.) At 
the time of his arrest, Mr. Johnson was driving a van that contained other wire alleged to 
belong to Union Pacific. (Tr., p.153, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Johnson was originally charged with 
grand theft by disposal of stolen property. (R., pp.32-33.) Subsequently, this charge 
was amended to grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R., pp.41-42.) 
Prior to trial, Mr. Johnson challenged the sufficiency the evidence presented at 
the preliminary hearing to sustain this charge. (R., p.39.) Specifically, Mr. Johnson 
asserted that: the testimony at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the 
market value of the copper wire was over $1,000; the State improperly relied on 
testimony regarding replacement value of the copper wire in contravention of I.C. 3 18- 
2402(a); the proper market value of the wire was $665.05 - the price that was paid for 
the raw materials of the wire by the recycling center; and that, in the event that this 
amount was not deemed to be the proper market value, the default value of the wire 
should be deemed to be under $1,000 pursuant to I.C. § 18-2402(c). (R., pp.55-61.) 
The district court denied Mr. Johnson's motion challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented by the State at the preliminary hearing. (R., pp.80-90.) In doing so, 
the district court held that the price paid by the recycling company for the wire was a 
"salvage price," and that this price "typically" is not the same as market price. (R., p.87.) 
The district court provided no analysis or legal authority for this conclusion. After 
making this conclusion, the district court proceeded to hold that there was sufficient 
evidence "that would legally permit the Magistrate to conclude that the market value of 
the wire could not be satisfactorily ascertained and that the replacement value is a 
reasonably close approximation of the design and quality of the destroyed item." 
(R., pp.87-88.) The district court then stated that the differences between the old wire 
that was allegedly stolen and the new, replacement wire were not substantial enough to 
preclude the use of the alleged replacement cost because "[i]t is only where there is 
'little or no relationship' to the quality and value of the destroyed property that a fact- 
finder should not be allowed to consider replacement cost." (R., p.88.) Because both 
wires were made from copper, the district court concluded that the wires were 
sufficiently similar. (R., pp.88-89.) 
At trial, Officer Milovanovic testified as to the circumstances that caused him to 
arrest Mr. Johnson for grand theft. (Tr., p.119, L.3 - p.163, L.16.) However, he also 
conceded that there was no direct evidence that Mr. Johnson had actually taken the 
wire from the signal poles, rather than merely finding the wire by the road. (Tr., p.164, 
L.10 - p.166, L.25.) The officer acknowledged that some of the wire that was taken was 
no longer being actively used by the railroad and had potentially been hanging from the 
poles for up to one hundred years. (Tr., p. 172, L.16 - p. 173, L. 18.) 
In addition to his testimony regarding the circumstances leading to Mr. Johnson's 
charges in this case, Officer Milovanovic also testified about some of Mr. Johnson's 
statements that were made in connection with charges he faced in Lincoln County. 
(Tr., p.156, L.23 - p.162, L.15.) Apparently, after talking with officers about some wire 
that was in his truck at the time of his arrest, Mr. Johnson made a vague statement that 
he "knew it was wrong," when he took the wire that was in his van on that day. 
(Tr., p.162, Ls.13-15.) The wire in question was not the subject of his charges at trial. 
(Tr., p.159, L.18 - p.160, L.21.) The district court had earlier ruled that evidence of the 
surrounding circumstances of the other charge out of Lincoln County could be 
introduced at trial in order to support an inference that Mr. Johnson had knowledge that 
the wire that was the subject of the charges was stolen. (Tr., p.60, L.20 - p.67, L.23.) 
The State also presented the testimony of an employee of Pacific Steel and 
Recycling, Russ Taylor. (Tr., p.175, Ls.14-18.) He testified that the recycling center 
took additional steps, mainly requiring a copy of the person's driver's license, when they 
engaged in transactions involving the sale of aluminum and copper because those 
items are sometimes stolen prior to being brought in for sale. (Tr., p.176, L.7 - p.177, 
L.18.) The recycling center also generates receipts showing the weight and type of 
metal, what was paid for it, and who brought the metal in for sale. (Tr., p.178, L.20 - 
p.179, L.17.) Mr. Taylor further testified that the copper processed for resale at their 
facility usually sold for between $3.10 and $3.25 per pound to the companies that 
bought copper from the recycling center. (Tr., p.189, Ls.1-10.) Another employee of 
the recycling center who processed the wire that Mr. Johnson brought in testified that 
Mr. Johnson represented that he acquired the wire from his brother when he passed 
away. (Tr., p.201, L.7 - p.203, L.2.) 
Douglas Richard, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad, provided testimony 
regarding the costs to replace the missing wire with new wire. (Tr., p.219, L.21 - p.231, 
L.4.) According to Mr. Richard's calculations, the equivalent cost - based on the same 
amount of pounds of new wire as was allegedly sold by Mr. Johnson to Pacific Steel 
and Recycling -was approximately $2,000. (Tr., p.228, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) There was 
nothing in Mr. Richard's calculations that provided for the depreciation in value of the 
old wire that was actually taken and that could have been as much as I00 years old. 
(Tr., p.228, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) Mr. Richards did acknowledge the difference in quality 
between the replacement wire and that which was allegedly stolen; and he further 
admitted that he did not know the difference in value between the wire as taken and the 
wire that could be purchased to replace it. (Tr., p.234, L.7 - p.235, L.25.) 
At the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Johnson moved the district court, 
pursuant to I.C.R. 29, for a judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.240, Ls.11-16.) In support of 
this motion, Mr. Johnson argued to the district court that the State's evidence in the form 
of the receipts showing what Mr. Johnson was paid for the wire established the market 
value of the copper wire. (Tr., p.241, L.23 - p.242, L.4.) Defense counsel asserted that 
Mr. Taylor's testimony regarding the amounts that the recycling center was paid by 
other purchasers for the copper would also establish a market value for the wire. 
(Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17) Given that the highest valuation for the resale of copper by the 
recycling center during the relevant time period was $3.25 per pound, this would make 
the market value for the copper, at most, $919.75. (Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17.) As such, the 
evidence showed that the market value of the wire was less than $1,000, and 
Mr. Johnson could only be guilty of petit theft. (Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17.) 
In addition, Mr. Johnson asserted that the value presented by the State - the 
replacement cost measured by the cost of brand new wires that had to be purchased in 
volume - was an inappropriate measure because it was not an approximation of the 
quality and value of the wire that was actually taken. (Tr., p.242, L.18 - p.243, L.17.) 
Given this, Mr. Johnson asserted that this replacement cost should not be used as the 
measure for the degree of his offense. Finally, Mr. Johnson asserted that the State 
failed to produce evidence that Mr. Johnson actually knew that the wire was stolen. 
(Tr., p.244, Ls.16-23.) 
At the same time, Mr. Johnson also informed the district court that a defense 
witness, James Arterburn, who had been missing and whom defense counsel had been 
unable to locate, had contacted defense counsel earlier that day. (Tr., p.240, L.16 - 
p.241, L.3.) Mr. Johnson informed the court that Mr. Arterburn could testify that there 
were rolls of copper wire located behind Mr. Johnson's brother's house, which would 
corroborate Mr. Johnson's version of events regarding how he came to sell copper wire 
to Pacific Steel and Recycling. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9.) He could also testify as to the 
circumstances under which Mr. Johnson made one sale of copper wire under 
Mr. Arturburn's brother's name. (See State's Exhibit 9.) 
With regard to Mr. Johnson's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the State 
asserted that there was no market value for the copper wire that was allegedly stolen 
because the recycling company did not sell the wire in the same form as it received the 
wire. (Tr., p.246, Ld.4-14.) The State's sole argument with regard to the replacement 
value offered at trial was that this purported cost was measured close in time to the 
alleged timeframe that the property was taken. (Tr., p.246, L.15 - p.247, L.1.) The 
State made no argument that the replacement wire was similar in type or quality to the 
wire that was alleged to have been stolen. (Tr., p.246, L.15 - p.247, L.1.) As to 
Mr. Johnson's knowledge, the State relied on the fact that Mr. Johnson's tee shirt and 
the bag containing the receipts from the recycling center were in such proximity to the 
area where the wire was taken as to support an inference of knowledge. (Tr., p.247, 
Ls.2-11.) The State further argued that Mr. Johnson had brought in wire that was 
identified as wire belonging to the railroad based upon characteristics of gauge and 
oxidation. (Tr., p.247, L. 12 - p.248, L.3.) 
In response, Mr. Johnson pointed out that the amount that the Pacific Steel and 
Recycling Center paid for the wire was, itself, the market value. (Tr., p.248, Ls.5-I 1.) 
He also noted that simply because there was a very specific market for the copper wire 
did not lessen the fact that there was, in fact, a market. (Tr., p.248, Ls.5-24.) 
The district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could find that Mr. Johnson had taken the wire that was alleged to have been stolen. 
(Tr., p.249, L.23 - p.251, L.8.) Regarding the valuation issue, the district court found 
that the salvage value of the wire was approximately $665. (Tr., p.251, Ls.9-11.) The 
court further found that the "resell salvage value" of the copper wire was approximately 
$919. (Tr., p.251, Ls.11-12.) Finally, the district court noted that the third proposed 
valuation was the estimate of replacement cost that was nearly $2,000. (Tr., p.251, 
Ls.23-24.) However, the district court ultimately found valuation to be an issue for the 
jury that was, in the court's view and without further explanation, somehow contingent 
on whether the jury believed that the wire taken was active signal wire or was instead 
inactive wire. (Tr., p.251, L.24 - p.252, L.8.) 
When defense counsel asked for the opportunity to clarify the district court's 
ruling, the court denied her request, stating, "No. You made your argument, let me 
finish my comments." (Tr., p.252, Ls.9-11.) 
After the district court's ruling denying the defense motion for a judgment of 
acquittal, the court then returned to the issue of whether Mr. Arterburn would be 
permitted to testify for the defense. (Tr., p.252, Ls.24-25.) Defense counsel clarified 
that she had been aware of this witness, but had been unable to locate him as 
apparently Mr. Aterburn's phone had been disconnected. (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-8, 22-25.) 
While defense counsel had attempted to contact Mr. Aterburn through other people, it 
further appears that counsel's efforts were not availing until the morning of 
Mr. Johnson's request to present Mr. Arterburn's testimony after defense counsel was 
approached by Mr. Arterburn in the hallway of the courthouse. (Tr., p.253, L.22 - p.254, 
L.7.) 
Defense counsel iterated for the district court the importance of Mr. Arterburn's 
testimony to the defense case. (Tr., p.254, L.7 - p.255, L.2.) Mr. Arterburn could 
corroborate Mr. Johnson's prior representations to the employees at the recycling 
center that the wire came from his deceased brother's property, rather than being from 
any of the signal poles owned by the Union Pacific Railroad. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9, p.254, 
Ls.7-9.) Mr. Arterburn had apparently seen the spools of copper wire behind 
Mr. Johnson's brother's house. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-5.) Additionally, Mr. Arterburn and 
Randy Arterburn, his brother, had given Mr. Johnson permission to use their existing 
account at the recycling center to process one of his sales of copper wire. (Tr., p.241, 
Ls.6-9.) This was the reason that Randy Aterburn's name appeared on one of the 
receipts for the recycling center. (State's Exhibit 9.) In light of the fact that 
Mr. Arterburn had no apparent motivation to make up a story, defense counsel argued 
that the importance to Mr. Johnson's defense of Mr. Arterburn's corroboration was 
enormous. (Tr., p.255, Ls.10-23.) 
The State objected to the presentation of this witness due to a lack of notice. 
Specifically, the prosecutor argued that she was never told by the defense that they 
were still searching for a potential witness nor informed of Mr. Arterburn at all. 
(Tr., p.253, Ls.11-17.) Additionally, the State mentioned that the notice was extremely 
late and, "the state has already rested." (Tr., p.253, Ls.18-19.) 
Because the State had requested discovery under I.C.R. 16, and because the 
defense admittedly did not provide Mr. Arterburn's name as a potential witness, the 
district court found that the disclosure was "way beyond late." (Tr., p.255, Ls.12-19.) 
The district court further found that defense counsel's inability to locate Mr. Arterburn as 
a witness did not excuse the obligation to also disclose him to the State. (Tr., p.256, 
Ls.5-12.) But rather than balance the potential prejudice to Mr. Johnson's ability to 
present a defense against the potential prejudice to the State, or consider lesser 
remedies, the district court denied Mr. Johnson's request to present Mr. Arterburn's 
testimony and concluded: 
It is the court's discretion to impose sanctions with regard to discovery 
violations. The pretrial order in this case required disclosure of witnesses 
to be completed long ago. I'm not going to permit Mr. Arterburn to testify 
in this case. 
(Tr., p.256, Ls.13-17.) 
Mr. Johnson testified on his own behalf at trial. (Tr., p.258, Ls.10-22.) In addition 
to other seasonal work, Mr. Johnson was a "scrapper" of various metals. (Tr., p.260, 
Ls.15-23.) This usually involved him taking trips to refuse dumps to look for the raw 
materials to be recycled - generally found in items such as bent pipes, old radiators, 
and scrap wires. (Tr., p.260, L.15 - p.261, L.12.) He would then do some minimal 
processing of these materials so as to prepare them to be sold to the recycling center. 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-24.) Mr. Johnson would often cut the pieces of metal into smaller 
pieces because that made them easier to transport and because the recycling center 
preferred him to do so. (Tr., p.261, Ls.13-24.) 
Mr. Johnson informed the jury that his brother had recently passed away in a 
motorcycle collision, which left Mr. Johnson in the position of having to take care of his 
brother's estate. (Tr., p.259, L.13 - p.260, L.4.) While taking a look at his brother's 
property, Mr. Johnson discovered some rolls of old, oxidized copper wire in the weeds 
next to a shop. (Tr., p.262, Ls.8-25.) He testified that there was nothing in particular 
about this wire that led him to believe that it was stolen. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1-3.) 
Mr. Johnson gathered up the wire, took it to where he was staying, and cut it into pieces 
so that he could fit it into his backpack and sell it to the recycling center. (Tr., p.263, 
Ls.7-15, p.264, Ls.3-7.) He took two different loads of copper wire from his brother's 
property in to Pacific Steel and Recycling to be sold. (Tr., p.263, Ls.10-24.) 
On another occasion, Mr. Johnson was driving nearby to some railroad tracks 
when some wire became entangled in the undercarriage of his van. (Tr., p.264, L.14 - 
p.266, L.24.) After hearing the wire dragging underneath his van, Mr. Johnson stopped 
the van, got out, and saw that the wire beneath his van was copper. (Tr., p.266, Ls.8- 
19.) It looked like the wire had been abandoned, so Mr. Johnson decided that he would 
cut the length of wire into smaller pieces and transport it in his van. (Tr., p.266, Ls.21- 
24.) According to Mr. Johnson, the bag containing garbage, his tee shirt, and the 
receipts must have fallen out of his van at this time and been blown closer to the train 
tracks. (Tr., p.267, Ls.16-23.) 
After the defense rested, the district court, outside of the presence of the jury, 
asked both Mr. Johnson and the State whether they had any objections or additions to 
the proposed jury instructions. (Tr., p.302, L.2 - p.303, L.lO.) Neither party did. 
(Tr., p.302, L.2 - p.303, L.lO.) The district court provided a jury instruction indicating 
that "value," for purposes of determining whether the grand theft charge was 
established, was determined by: 
The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if 
the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of 
replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime. 
When the value of the property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained 
pursuant to any of the above standards, its value shall be deemed to be 
$1,000 or less. 
(Tr., p.310, L.18-p.311, L.1.) 
The district court noted that the State bore the burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the alleged theft was a grand theft - that the value of the property 
alleged to have been taken was over $1,000. (Tr., p.309, L.17-21.) But the district 
court also instructed the jury that the State's burden of proof only extended to material 
elements of the offense as set forth in the court's instruction. (Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22.) 
And the district court never instructed the jury as to the legal definition of "market value," 
that the State bore the burden of establishing that market value could not be 
satisfactorily ascertained before they could consider any purported replacement costs, 
nor did the court instruct the jury that the State had to establish the similarity in quality, 
design, and value between the alleged property taken and the proffered replacement 
cost in order for the replacement cost to be the proper measure of the grade of the 
offense. (Tr., p.304, L.8 - p.314, L.23.) 
In addition, the district court provided the following, non-pattern jury instruction: 
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried 
by the State of Idaho do not require the State to prove every fact and 
every circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof 
extends only to the material elements of the offense. These material 
elements are set forth in the following instruction. 
(Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22; R., p.167.) 
The district court then provided an instruction outlining the elements of theft by 
possession of stolen property. (Tr., p.307, L.23 - p.309, L.2; R., p.168.) 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor asserted that, "... the defendant and 
[Officer Milovanovic] both I.D. the third batch that came in as Union Pacific Railroad wire 
because that was a different color than the wire the defendant brought in with the green 
tint." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-20.) In actuality, Mr. Johnson had never conceded or identified 
any of the wire that he had brought in for sale at the recycling center as being from the 
Union Pacific Railroad. (Tr., p.258, L.10 - p.300, L.7.) In fact, Mr. Johnson had actually 
testified that there was nothing in any of the wire that he had found and sold that 
indicated anyone's ownership, and specifically nothing that would indicate to him that 
the wire belonged to Union Pacific. (Tr., p.299, L.23 - p.300, L.7.) 
In addition, the prosecutor specifically highlighted those aspects of Mr. Johnson's 
testimony that would have been supported by the testimony of Mr. Aterburn had the 
district court not excluded him as a witness; and, in doing so, challenged the credibility 
of Mr. Johnson's version of events. (Tr,. p.322, L.3 - p.324, L.6.) Despite having been 
informed a few hours earlier that Mr. Aterburn could provide testimony regarding why 
Mr. Johnson was using Mr. Aterburn's brother's account with the recycling company, 
which would clarify why one of the receipts reflected Randy Aterburn's name as the 
person on the account, the prosecutor argued to the jury (who were completely unaware 
of this witness) that the presence of Randy Aterburn's name on the receipt was part of 
an attempt by Mr. Johnson to mislead the recycling company. (Tr., p.322, L.3 - p.323, 
L.6.) During closing arguments, the prosecutor also attempted to cast doubt on 
Mr. Johnson's testimony that his brother had died, which was another fact that could 
have been verified by Mr. Aterburn. (Tr., p.323, L.14 - p.324, L.6.) 
Finally, the prosecutor made the following statement to the jury: 
On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long celebrated 
industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of competition out 
there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats, planes, and most of all 
technology, but that doesn't make it okay for thieves to be targeting 
railroad property. Railroad lines are not for scavengers and that is what 
the defendant is. He is a scavenger. He is a buzzard. His is picking off 
the bones of the railroad industry. 
(Tr., p.330, L.25 - 331, L.8.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Johnson of grand theft by possession of stolen property, 
and further found him guilty of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
(Tr., p.386, Ls.17-18, p.399, Ls.9-17, R., pp.178, 180.) Upon being convicted of grand 
theft, Mr. Johnson filed another I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., pp.190- 
200.) In this motion, Mr. Johnson alleged that there was insufficient proof to establish 
that, at the time he acquired it, the wire was stolen rather than abandoned by the 
railroad; that Mr. Johnson knew that the wire was actually stolen; that the value of the 
copper wire exceeded $1,000; and that the replacement value provided for the wire was 
an accurate measure given the differences between the wire taken and the replacement 
wire. (R., pp.190-200.) 
At the hearing on this motion, Mr. Johnson pointed out directly that the State 
failed to prove that the market value could not be satisfactorily ascertained, and that the 
State presented no testimony or evidence whatsoever regarding the issue of market 
value, but instead relied exclusively on evidence of the replacement cost of the wire. 
(Tr., p.411, L.20 - p.412, L.4.) As noted by Mr. Johnson, the State, "declared that the 
two values that were presented by the defense were simply salvage value, skipped right 
over market value and went to replacement cost without attempting to show that we 
couldn't determine what the market value was." (Tr., p.411, L.25 - p.412, L.4.) 
In response, the State noted that these same arguments were made in support of 
Mr. Johnson's earlier motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied, and that the 
inferences from the evidence supported the jury's verdict. (Tr., p.416, L.12 - p.419, 
L. 16.) 
The district court denied Mr. Johnson's motion. ( T .  p.434, Ls.13-20.) 
Regarding the issue of sufficiency of the evidence that the property was abandoned, the 
district court noted that the jury's finding that Mr. Johnson was guilty of a theft would be 
directly contrary to a finding that the wires at issue were abandoned, and that there was 
evidence to support this finding. (Tr., p.426, L.20 - p.429, L.25.) The district court 
noted that the jury's verdict reflected an adverse credibility determination against 
Mr. Johnson given that they rejected his testimony about where he had found the wire. 
(Tr., p.430, Ls.1-16.) 
As to Mr. Johnson's contentions regarding the issue of the valuation of the wire, 
the district court acknowledged that this was a close issue. (Tr., p.430, Ls.17-18.) 
Notably, the district court stated, "It's always been a troubling point in this case as to 
whether the wire that was taken down was an active line or an inactive line. I think the 
assumption being made is if it's an inactive line then it's worthless. I don't think 
anybody testified to that." (Tr., p.431, Ls.16-20.) However, because the segments of 
the wire could not have been practicably spliced together to serve the purpose to which 
the railroad was using them, the district court determined that it was proper to use as 
the measure or value of the replacement costs. (Tr., p.433, Ls.4-17.) 
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor originally requested an additional 
30 days in order to consult with Union Pacific Railroad regarding restitution because she 
was "not exactly sure" of the amount of restitution that would be requested. (Tr., p.444, 
Ls.15-19.) Defense counsel asked for a hearing on the issue of restitution and agreed 
that the 30 days requested by the prosecution would be a reasonable amount of time in 
order to prepare. (Tr., p.445, Ls.2-6.) Despite the mutual request for 30 days, and the 
lack of any specific figure from the State as to the basis for restitution, the district court 
ordered restitution in the amount of $2,000 even. (Tr., p.448, Ls.14-17.) The district 
court then denied Mr. Johnson's request for a restitution hearing. (Tr., p.448, Ls.20-24.) 
Mr. Johnson asked the court to reconsider in light of the evidentiary issues at play. 
(Tr., p.449, Ls.3-10.) 
The district court granted the motion, provided that Mr. Johnson submitted notice 
seeking the restitution hearing. (Tr., p.449, Ls.11-13.) The State then shifted its earlier 
posture and asserted that there was no reason why the restitution issue could not be 
decided at the sentencing hearing based upon the testimony given at trial. (Tr., p.455, 
Ls.16-21.) Mr. Johnson asked that he be allowed to cross-examine the State's witness 
who testified as to the replacement cost of the wire because it was still an open 
question as to whether the railroad ever intended to actually replace the full amount of 
wire - including the inactive wire - that was alleged to have been taken. (Tr., p.455, 
L.23 - p.457, L.8.) The district court then reversed itself and concluded: 
I'm going to reverse myself from what I said earlier. Frankly, I've heard 
the restitution argument in this case already about three times now. What 
I'm ruling in my discretion, which restitution is a discretionary function, is a 
$2,000 restitution. 
, . 
(Tr., p.457, Ls.15-19.) I j , , 
The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to 14 years, with five years fixed, for his .. . 
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conviction of grand theft. (Tr., p.454, Ls.8-13; R., pp.205-208.) Mr. Johnson timely 
appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., pp.205, 210.) :.  , 
ISSUES 
1. Was there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt on the charge 
of grand theft? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to properly instruct the jury that the State bore 
the burden of proof to establish that the market value was not ascertainable; in 
failing to instruct the jury that, in order to use replacement value, the State first 
had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the replacement cost offered by 
the State was for property that was similar in quality, design, and value as that 
alleged to have been stolen; and further err in instructing the jury that the State 
did not have the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts other than 
those outlined by the district court? 
3. Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Johnson's constitutional right to present 
an adequate defense and to compulsory process, when the court excluded an 
exculpatory defense witness as a discovery sanction? 
4. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error 
when she referred to Mr. Johnson as a "scavenger" and a "buzzard;" and when 
she mischaracterized the substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony during closing 
arguments? 
5. Did the district court err when the court awarded restitution in the amount of 
$2,000? 




There Was Insufficient Evidence To Supoort The Juw's Verdict Of Guilt On The Charqe 
Of Grand Theft 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the fact of the value of the wire was the determinative fact of 
whether Mr. Johnson was guilty of a misdemeanor, with a maximum statutory 
punishment of one year, or of a felony, with a maximum statutory punishment of 14 
years. However, there were two other predicate factual findings that the jury had to 
make before it could reach the conclusion that Mr. Johnson was guilty of a felony. The 
only purported value that could elevate Mr. Johnson's offense to a felony was the 
replacement value as set forth by Mr. Richard's testimony. But, in order to apply the 
replacement value, the jury had to first find that the market value for the property could 
not be satisfactorily ascertained and then also find that the replacement cost submitted 
by the State was for property of like quality and value as that of the property taken. 
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of either of these facts, 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the charge of grand theft. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193 
(Ct. App. 1998). This Court will not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of 
the evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the 
evidence for that of the jury. Id. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State. Id. Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within the 
province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is 
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d 
1338,1341 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Where, as here, a defendant elects to introduce evidence rather than to rely 
solely on a I.C.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant waives the right 
to limit this Court's review on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the 
State's evidence. Id. Rather, this Court reviews all of the evidence, including that 
offered by the defense, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
the conviction. Id. 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Findina, Bevond A Reasonable 
Doubt, That Market Value Was Not Ascertainable Because The State's Own 
Evidence Established The Market Value Of The Copper Wire Alleaed To Have 
Been Stolen And Because The State Presented No Evidence That Market Value 
Could Not Reasonably Be Ascertained 
Under Idaho's statutory scheme for the grading of theft offenses, a theft 
constitutes a grand theft - as opposed to a misdemeanor petit theft - only if the State 
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the property taken exceeded 
$1,000. I.C. §§ 18-2403(4); 18-2407(b)(I). The maximum sentence for grand theft is 
14 years incarceration, while the statutory maximum sentence for petit theft is only one 
year. I.C. 5 18-2408. "Value" is defined, under I.C. § 18-2402, as: 
... the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if 
such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the 
property within a reasonable time after the crime. 
I.C. 3 18-2402(1 l)(a). 
Apparent in this statutory scheme is that the grade of the theft offense depends 
on the value of the property alleged to have been stolen. The ldaho Court of Appeals 
has addressed the meaning of "market value" as that term is used in I.C. § 18-2402(11). 
See State V. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 693, 169 P.3d 275,281 (Ct. App. 2007). The court 
clarified that market value is defined as, "the reasonable price at which the owner would 
hold those goods out for sale to the general public." Id. Alternatively, "fair market 
value" can also be defined as "the price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is 
willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 1587 (8th ed. 2004). 
Under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than a prior criminal conviction, 
which increases the maximum range of punishment that a defendant may receive for a 
criminal offense must be submitted to the jury and proved by the State beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,697-703 (1975). In 
light of these constitutional holdings, ldaho cases have recognized that any fact that a 
jury would have to find in order to increase the range of punishment faced by the 
defendant must be treated as an element of the offense for purposes of pleading and 
proof. See, e.g., State v. Gerardo, 147 ldaho 22, 30, 205 P.3d 671, 679 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
In this case, the fact of the value of the wire was the determinative fact of 
whether Mr. Johnson was guilty of a misdemeanor, with a maximum statutory 
punishment of one year, or of a felony, with a maximum statutory punishment of 14 
years. And only the replacement cost proffered by the State could support a finding of 
guilt of grand theft, rather than petit theft. However, there were two other predicate 
factual findings that the jury had to make before it could reach the conclusion that 
Mr. Johnson was guilty of a felony. The only purported value that could elevate 
Mr. Johnson's offense to a felony was the replacement value as set forth by 
Mr. Richard's testimony. But, in order to apply the replacement value, the jury had to 
first find that the market value for the property could not be satisfactorily ascertained 
and that the replacement cost submitted by the State was for property of like quality and 
value as that of the property taken. As such, because these two facts had to be found 
before replacement value could be used to determine the grade of the offense by the 
State, the State had the burden of proving these facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-703; accord State v. Martin, 23 
P.3d 216, 224-225 (Mont. 2001). 
This is consistent with the ldaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Hughes, 
130 ldaho 698,703, 946 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997). The defendant in Hughes 
was charged with malicious injury to property, which, like theft, is graded according to 
the value of the property at issue in the charge. Id. at 702, 946 P.2d at 1342. The 
Hughes Court first determined that, when the property at issue has been completely 
destroyed, the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the property's 
destruction is the proper measure of valuation. Id. at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343. While 
replacement value can be used in appropriate circumstances, the court held: 
... replacement cost evidence may be used as an indicator of value only 
when the State has demonstrated that the fair market value of the 
destroyed item is not reasonably ascertainable or that the item has no 
market value, and when replacement cost evidence is relied upon, the 
State must show that the replacement (whether actually purchased by the 
victim or not) is a reasonably close approximation of the design and 
qualify of the destroyed item. 
Id. 
There was insufficient evidence in this case that market value could not be 
satisfactorily ascertained. First, the State's own evidence demonstrated that there was, 
in fact, a market value for the copper wires and also established the value of the wires 
according to this standard. Second, even assuming that the State had not already 
presented evidence establishing the market value, the State presented no evidence that 
market value could not be satisfactorily ascertained. 
Here, the State put into evidence receipts from the Pacific Steel and Recycling 
Company that demonstrated the actual market value for the wire -the price that a seller 
was willing to accept and a buyer was willing to pay for the property on the open market 
in an arm's-length transaction. (State's Exhibits 9, 13, 14.) The State produced these 
receipts as exhibits for the jury. (Tr., p.135, L.25 - p.136, L.2.) This market value was 
only approximately $665, far short of the threshold of over $1,000 required for a 
conviction of grand theft. (Tr., p.242, Ls.3-4; State's Exhibits 9, 13, 14.) 
Other jurisdictions have similarly indicated that, where there is proof of the price 
received by the defendant for selling wires alleged to have been stolen, this proof is 
competent to establish the market value of the wire. See Greene v. State, 406 So.2d 
805, 808 (Miss. 1981); State v. Oft, 763 P.2d 810, 81 1-813 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Loddy v. State, 502 P.2d 194, 196 (Wyo. 1972); see also Dyba v. State, 549 S.W.2d 
178, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 
In Off, the defendant was charged with felony theft based upon the State's 
allegation that he had stolen and sold copper wire. Ott, 763 P.2d at 811-812. In 
support of its valuation of the copper wire, the State presented evidence of a sales 
receipt from the salvage company that had bought the wire, testimony regarding how 
much the specific wire was sold for, and testimony as to how much the salvage 
company paid for that type of wire at the time of the offense. Id. As does Idaho, Utah 
measures the value of property, for purposes of determining the grade of a theft 
offense, by market value. Id. at 813. Also like Idaho, Utah defines "market value" as 
the "measure of what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer 
would pay to the true owner of the stolen item." Id. Based upon these parameters, the 
Ott Court determined that the sale value of the wire to the salvage facility was an 
appropriate measure of the market value of the wire. Id. at 812-813. 
Aside from the fact that the State's own evidence established the market value 
for the copper wire alleged to have been stolen, the State also presented no evidence 
that the market value for copper wire could not be satisfactorily ascertained. Instead, 
the State merely posited a blanket assertion that salvage value could not be used as 
market value and that the change in length or shape of the the wire somehow meant 
that the value of the copper comprising the wire was not a "market value." (Tr., p.326, 
L.25 - p.327, L.ll.) It is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not competent 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Fondren, 24 ldaho 663, 135 P. 265, 267 (1913). Because 
the State presented no actual evidence in support of a claim that market value could not 
be satisfactorily ascertained, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict 
in this case. 
This conclusion is consistent with the holdings of other jurisdictions with similar 
statutory schemes regarding the valuation of property for purposes of determining the 
grade of a theft offense. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Ohms, 46 P.3d 263, 266-267 (Mont. 2002); 
Robinson v. Stafe, 686 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). As noted by the 
court in Robinson: 
The record does not reflect that the state made any effort of showing that 
it could not "satisfactorily ascertain" the market value of the smoke 
detectors removed from the walls. This step was necessary to justify the 
value of the loss being ascertained by the cost of replacement of the 
property. The state failed to carry its burden of proof as to the value 
element under a grand theft charge. 
Robinson, 686 So.2d at 1373. 
The Montana Supreme Court similarly held that: 
... the State failed to establish that the market value could not be 
satisfactorily ascertained. Instead, the State chose to rely exclusively on 
the replacement value to meet its burden of proof. The State failed to 
establish the necessary predicate to the use of replacement value for 
purposes of determining value under $ 45-2-1 01 (74)(a), MCA (1 997). 
Accordingly, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of felony theft, as defined by statute, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Ohms, 46 P.3d at 267. 
D. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Conclusion Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt That The Replacement Value Put Forth Bv The State Was For Property 
That Was Similar In Quality, Desiqn. And Value As That Of The Wire Alleaed To 
Have Been Stolen 
While ldaho appellate courts have not addressed the parameters of the use of 
replacement value for purposes of determining the grade of a theft offense, this issue 
has been addressed with regards to a charge of malicious injury to property where the 
property at issue has been completely destroyed as opposed to merely damaged. See 
Hughes, 130 ldaho at 702-704, 946 P.2d at 1342-1344. As previously noted, the 
Hughes Court held that, where the State seeks to use replacement cost as the measure 
of damages, the State bears the burden to show that the replacement cost proffered 
bears a reasonably close relationship to the quality and value of the property at issue in 
the charge. Id. In explaining this holding, the court noted: 
If the State attempts to prove value through replacement cost, however, 
we think it incumbent upon the State to produce some evidence that the 
replacement item is of a quality and design comparable to that of the 
destroyed item. This is so because a replacement actually purchased by 
the crime victim may bear little or no relationship to the quality and value 
of the destroyed property, and the classification of the offense as a felony 
or a misdemeanor should not turn upon the victim's choice between a 
higher quality, more expensive replacement and a lower quality, more 
modestly priced item. 
Id. As such, the State must first prove that the replacement value being proffered bears 
a close relationship in quality, design, and value to the property alleged to have been 
stolen in order to use replacement cost as the measure of the grade of the offense. 
This is in accord with the holdings of other jurisdictions that have similarly limited 
the use of replacement cost in the valuation of property for purposes of establishing the 
grade of a theft offense to a value that is similar in kind to that of the property taken. 
See, e.g., People v. A.G., 605 P.2d 487, 488 (Colo. App. 1979); Romero v. State, 996 
P.2d 894, 896-897 (Nev. 2000.). The Nevada Supreme Court in Romero noted: 
... when the replacement cost is based upon current market price for an 
unused new item, such evidence alone is generally not sufficient to 
establish the monetary thresholds which distinguish between 
misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony property crimes. Such a 
rule is mandated by the language of the statute, which separates the 
various degrees of theft based upon the value of the property that was 
stolen, not the cost to replace the stolen property with a brand new item. 
Romero, 966 P.2d at 896-897. Likewise, the Colorado court in A.G. reversed the 
defendant's conviction for felony theft due to insufficient evidence because neither the 
replacement value nor the original purchase price put forth by the State reflected the 
depreciation in value due to the age of the items alleged to be stolen. A.G., 605 P.2d at 
Here, the State's own evidence established that the wires alleged to have been 
stolen were used in the telegraph service and could be approximately one hundred 
years old. (Tr., p.173, Ls.4-10.) The State's own evidence also established that there 
were significant differences in the quality and design of the wire alleged to have been 
taken and the wire used to calculate replacement cost. (Tr., p.235, Ls.1-25.) The wire 
alleged to have been taken was very old; oxidized and corroded; and parts of the wire 
were affixed with old tape, insulation, tar, and fibers. (Tr., p.235, Ls.1-16.) In contrast, 
the wire used to value replacement cost was brand new and covered with a plastic 
insulated coating, presumably to guarantee a lifetime of operability and use far in 
excess of that of the corroded old wires. (Tr., p.234, Ls.7-16.) Additionally, the State's 
own witness testified that he was unable to determine the difference in value between 
the old wire and the new wire because he was not a "scrap dealer." (Tr., p.235, Ls.17- 
25.) 
The replacement value proffered by the State in this case was, by the State's 
own evidence, not for property that was similar in quality, design, and value as that 
alleged to have been stolen. As such, the State did not meet its burden with regards to 
the presentation of an adequate replacement cost; and therefore the jury's verdict in this 
case was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
E. The Default Value Of Propertv In Absence Of Proof Of Market Value Or Proper 
Replacement Cost Is Less Than $1,000 
Under I.C. § 18-2402(11)(c), when the value of property cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained wither through the market value of the property at the time and place of the 
crime, or by a proper measure of the replacement cost, "its value shall be deemed to be 
one thousand dollars ($1,000) or less." I.C. 3 18-2402(1l)(c). Assuming, arguendo, 
that this Court determines that the State had adduced sufficient proof to establish that 
the market value of the property could not be satisfactorily ascertained, and because 
the replacement cost proffered by the State was not representative of the quality and 
value of the property alleged to have been stolen, the default provisions of I.C. § 18- 
2402(1 l)(c) would then apply. This renders the default value of the property at issue in 
this case to be $1,000 dollars or less. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Johnson's 
conviction for grand theft, along with the persistent violator enhancement, and remand 
this case for resentencing on the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft. 
There was insufficient evidence in this case to support a guilty verdict on the 
charge of grand theft. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson asks that this Court vacate his 
judgment of his conviction and remand his case for entry of a conviction on the lesser 
offense of misdemeanor theft. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 704,946 P.2d at 1344. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Properly lnstruct The Jurv That The State Bore 
The Burden Of Proof To Establish That Market Value Was Not Ascertainable And 
Failing To lnstruct The Jurv That, In Order To Use Replacement Value, The State First 
Had To Establish Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The Replacement Cost Offered By 
The State Was For Property That Was Similar In Quality, Design. And Value As That 
Alleged To Have Been Stolen; And Further Erred In lnstructinq The Jurv That The State 
Did Not Have The Burden To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. Facts Other Than 
Those Outlined By Specifically The District Court 
A. Introduction 
The district court in this case failed to instruct the jury that the State bore the 
burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the market value for the wire 
alleged to have been stolen could not be reasonably ascertained before the jury could 
use replacement value to measure the grade of the offense; and that the State also 
bore the burden of proof to establish that the replacement cost put forth by the State 
was for property that was similar in design, quality, and value as that alleged to have 
been taken. This error was compounded by the district court's use of a non-pattern jury 
instruction that informed the jurors that the State did not have to prove all of the facts in 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and that district court would tell them what facts 
the State did have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Taken as a whole, the district 
court's instructions as given to the jury rose to the level of fundamental error that 
relieved the State of its burden of proof in this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law that 
this Court reviews de novo. State v. Pearce, 146 ldaho 241, 247, 192 P.3d 1065, 1071 
(2008); State v. Rolon, 146 ldaho 684, 693, 201 P.3d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 2008). This 
Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole in order to determine whether the 
instructions fully and accurately reflect applicable law. Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 
C. The District Court Erred In Failina To Properlv lnstruct The Jurv That The State 
Bore The Burden Of Proof To Establish That Market Value Was Not 
Ascertainable And Failina To lnstruct The Jurv That, In Order To Use 
Replacement Value, The State First Had To Establish Bevond A Reasonable 
Doubt That The Replacement Cost Offered By The State Was For Property That 
Was Similar In Quality, Desian. And Value As That Alleaed To Have Been 
Stolen: And Further Erred In lnstructina The Jurv That The State Did Not Have 
The Burden To Prove. Bevond A Reasonable Doubt. Facts Other Than Those 
Specificallv Outlined By The District Court 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that Mr. Johnson did not object to the 
district court's proposed jury instructions in this case. While ordinarily a party may not 
claim error in the court's jury instruction on appeal absent an objection prior to 
deliberations, certain claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on 
appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 748, 
170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007); Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d at 662. An instructional 
error is fundamental if it so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice 
and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process. Id. "Jury instructions 
that fail to require the State to prove every element of the offense violate due process 
and, thus, rise to the level of a fundamental error." Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d 
at 662. 
The district court in this case failed to instruct the jury that, before they could 
resort to the replacement cost put forth by the State in order to measure the grade of 
the offense, the State had to first prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: (1) the 
market value of the wires alleged to have been stolen could not be satisfactorily 
ascertained; and (2) the replacement cost proffered by the State was for property 
reasonably close in quality, design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen. 
(Tr., p.304, L.8 - p.315, L.4.) As previously noted, the State bore the burden of 
establishing these facts beyond a reasonable doubt because these facts were 
prerequisite findings to any valuation of the property alleged to have been stolen at a 
value of over $1,000 - the threshold finding for elevating Mr. Johnson's offense from a 
misdemeanor to a felony. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697- 
703; Point I(C) supra. Because the district court failed to inform the jury that the State 
bore the burden of proving these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the court 
affirmatively relieved the State of its constitutional obligation of proof in this case. 
This omission was exacerbated by another of the district court's instructions that 
informed the jury that, unless told otherwise by the court, the State did not have to prove 
any fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court provided the jury with a non- 
pattern instruction that: 
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried 
by the State of Idaho do nof require fhe State to prove every fact and 
every circumstance in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden 
of proof extends only to the material elements of the offense. These 
maferial elements are sef forth in the following insfrucfion. 
(Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22; R., p.167.) (emphasis added.) 
The "following instruction" referred to in the singular was an instruction on the 
elements of theft by possession of stolen property. (Tr., p.307, L.23 - p.309, L.2; 
R., p.168.) This instruction did not include the value element that established the grade 
of the offense. (Tr., p.307, L.23 - p.309, L.2; R., p.168.) In another instruction, the jury 
was informed that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
value of the property alleged to have been stolen was over $1,000 in value in order to 
convict Mr. Johnson of grand theft. (Tr. p.309, Ls.17-22; R., p.170.) However, as 
previously noted, the district court made no such instruction regarding the requirement 
that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that market value could not be 
satisfactorily ascertained and that the replacement cost put forth by the State bears a 
close relationship in quality, design, and value to the property alleged to have been 
stolen. 
A similar instruction was criticized in the recent ldaho Court of Appeals decision 
in State V. Rossignol, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 1637035 (Ct. App. 
2009).' In that case, the district court instructed the jury that it would outline for the jury 
the elements of the offense that had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
also contained a similar provision that it was not necessary for the State "to establish 
every fact and every circumstance put into evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 
*14. The defendant's challenge to the instruction was limited to the fact that the district 
court purported to outline the elements of the offense, but did not immediately do so. Id. 
at "13. The court in Rossignol found that, when read as a whole, the elements 
As of the writing of this brief, the opinion in Rossignol has not yet been released for 
publication in the permanent law reports and is therefore subject to revision or 
withdrawal. 
instructions for the two charged offenses were ultimately provided to the jury, and 
therefore the court did not find error. Id. at 14. In doing so, however, the Rossignol 
Court also criticized the use of this instruction: 
... we take this opportunity to reiterate that deviations from the pattern lCJl 
"have created unnecessary controversies with nothing added by way of 
clarity ... Trial courts are encouraged to avoid unnecessary appeals and 
controversy by utilizing the instruction that has an accepted history 
defining the burden the State bears." 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
Here, the flaw with the instruction employed by the district court creates a 
different and much more serious problem -this instruction appears to have affirmatively 
informed the jury that the State did not have to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt 
unless the district court instructed them that this burden existed for that fact. This is an 
incorrect statement of the law that affirmatively relieved the State of its burden of 
proving facts that were necessary in order for Mr. Johnson to be found guilty of grand 
theft, as opposed to the lesser charge of petit theft. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; 
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-703. As such, the district court's jury instructions in this case 
amounted to fundamental error because they relieved the State of its constitutional 
burden of proof. 
D.. The Instructional Error In This Case Was Not Harmless 
This Court employs a constitutional harmless error test to cases where the 
district court erroneously omits an essential element from the instructions to the jury. 
Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d at 662. Under this test, an error cannot be deemed 
harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. Relevant 
to this determination is whether the evidence ot the omitted element was controverted at 
trial and whether the evidence was overwhelming. Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d 
at 662. The State bears the burden of showing that the error had no effect on a 
defendant's substantial rights. Id. at 694, 201 P.3d at 663. 
Here, there was a dearth of any evidence that would support the two findings that 
the jury was never told the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, 
the issue of whether there was a market value and the appropriate measure of the 
market value was hotly contested throughout the proceedings, as was the issue of 
whether the replacement cost proffered by the State was for property that was a 
reasonably close approximation of that alleged to have been stolen. This is not a case 
where there was overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that would have supported 
the pertinent findings. 
Moreover, the ldaho Supreme Court has specifically noted that prejudice flowing 
from an omitted element may be exacerbated in light of the other instructions provided 
from the district court that minimized the importance of the element. Anderson, 144 
ldaho at 748-749, 170 P.3d at 891-892. Here, the district court, in essence, excused 
the State from its burden of proof by informing the jury that the State did not have to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact unless they were told by the district court 
that the State bore the burden for that finding or element. 
The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Johnson's Constitutional Riaht To Present An 
Adeauate Defense And To Compulsory Process, When The Court Excluded An 
Excul~atory Defense Witness As A Discovetv Sanction 
A. Introduction 
Defense counsel was approached on the morning of the second day of trial by a 
potential witness - James Arterburn - that counsel had previously tried, unsuccessfully, 
to locate prior to trial. Defense counsel never provided notice to the State pursuant to 
I.C.R. 16 of this potential witness. The district court ruled that this witness would be 
excluded from trial based solely upon the lateness of the disclosure. However, the 
district court never engaged in the required analysis of balancing Mr. Johnson's right to 
a fair trial against the potential prejudice to the State, the State alleged no prejudice 
flowing from the possible introduction this witness' testimony at trial, and the district 
court failed to consider any potential lesser sanctions as a remedy for the discovery 
violation. Because the district court failed to act consistently with applicable legal 
standards, the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Mr. Arterburn from 
testifying in Mr. Johnson's trial. 
Moreover, this error was not harmless because this was a largely circumstantial 
case in which Mr. Johnson's credibility was of central importance to his defense. And, 
in closing arguments, the prosecutor specifically highlighted and attempted to discredit 
those portions of Mr. Johnson's testimony that Mr. Arterburn could have corroborated 
with his own testimony. 
6. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews the district court's exclusion of a witness as a sanction for a 
discovery violation for an abuse of discretion. Sfafe v. Harris, 132 ldaho 843, 846, 979 
P.2d. 1201, 1204 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130 ldaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997). 
Review for an abuse of discretion is a multi-tiered inquiry as to whether: (1) the district 
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the district court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) the 
district court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Harris, 132 ldaho at 
C. The District Court Erred. And Violated Mr. Johnson's Constitutional Riahts To 
Present An Adequate Defense And To Compulsory Process, When The District 
Court Excluded An Exculpatory Defense Witness As A Discoverv Sanction 
Without First Weighing Any Potential Preiudice To The State Aaainst 
Mr. Johnson's Riaht To A Fair Trial Or Considering Whether Anv Lesser 
Sanctions Would Adequateiv Address The Discovery Violation 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right pursuant to the Compulsory 
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to offer the testimony of witnesses on his or 
her behalf and to present evidence in his or her own defense.' Harris, 132 ldaho at 
846, 979 P.2d at 7204. Indeed, "[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense," which is "an essential attribute of the 
adversarial system itself." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988). The 
constitutional right to present a complete defense "is abridged by evidence rules that 
' The constitutional protections of the right to compulsory process and to present a 
meaningful defense, as protected by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are 
applicable on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). 
'infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are 'arbitrary or disproportionate 
to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 
324 (2006) (quoting U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). However, in some 
circumstances, the district court may be permitted to exclude entirely the testimony of a 
defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation. Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979 
P.2d at 1204. 
Under I.C.R. 16(c), upon a written request by the prosecuting attorney, the 
defense is required to disclose certain evidence that it intends to rely upon at trial, 
including, "a list of names and addresses the defendant intends to call at trial." I.C.R. 
16(c). A defendant is required to file and serve a written response to a discovery -- 
request within 14 days. I.C.R. 16(e)(l). This rule also authorizes the district court to 
impose sanctions as a result of a party failing to comply with the rule. I.C.R. 16(e)(2). 
Where the failure of defense counsel to comply with a valid discovery request 
and identify a witness is shown from the record to have been willful and intentional, 
complete exclusion of that witness' testimony can be appropriate regardless of other 
available sanctions short of excluding the witness. Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979 P.2d 
at 1204. However, in all other cases, the district court is required to weigh the prejudice 
that could be suffered by the State flowing from the late disclosure against the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id; State v. Albert, 138 ldaho 284, 288, 62 P.3d 208, 212 
(Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, mere absence of good cause for the failure to timely provide 
notice of the witness "is not necessarily commensurate with 'willful' conduct." Albeit 
138 ldaho at 288 n.2, 62 P.3d at 212 (quoting Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45,48 (2d 
Cir. 1988)). 
The ldaho Supreme Court decision in State v. Harris is particularly instructive for 
this Court. In Harris, defense counsel apparently neglected to provide any notice to the 
State of a potential defense witness at all prior to attempting to call the witness at trial. 
Harris, 132 ldaho at 845, 979 P.2d at 1204. The State objected to the calling of this 
witness due to the lack of notice, and asked that this witness be excluded from testifying 
at trial. Id. The district court then excluded the witness from testifying, despite 
acknowledging that defense counsel's failure to disclose the witness in a timely fashion 
was inadvertent. Id. 
The Court in Harris determined that this was an abuse of discretion because, "the 
trial court did not weigh any prejudice that might be suffered by the State against Harris' 
right to a fair trial." Id. at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. There, as in this case, the district court 
improperly relied solely on the lateness of the disclosure of the witness where there was 
no indication from the State as to how this late disclosure created any prejudice to the 
State's case. (Tr., p.253, L. 'I 1 - p.256, L. 17.) 
Additionally, in Lamphere, the ldaho Supreme Court explicitly noted the fact that 
the State failed to allege any prejudice on the basis of the late disclosure of the witness, 
but rather simply objected based on the lateness of the disclosure, when the Court 
determined that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded a defense 
witness as a discovery violation. Lamphere, 130 ldaho at 633-634, 945 P.2d at 4-5. 
This mirrors the nature of the State's objection in this case, which was limited to the 
timing of defense counsel's disclosure of the witness at the close of the State's 
evidence, and contains no assertion of whether or how the State would suffer any 
prejudice as a result of the untimely disclosure. (Tr., p.253, Ls.11-20.) 
Moreover, in a serious felony case, "it is ordinarily the trial court's obligation 'to 
fashion a sanction which will impress counsel with the importance of responding to 
discovery requests, and yet will not prejudice the defense of the case."13 Albert, 138 
ldaho at 287, 62 P.3d at 211. The district court should also consider whether the 
discovery violation is attributable to defense counsel, rather than the defendant 
personally, prior to imposing the extreme remedy of complete exclusion of a witness 
from testifying at trial. State v. Winson, 129 ldaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010 
(Ct. App. 1996). While grand theft is normally not the most serious of felony offenses 
under ldaho law, it is important to remember that Mr. Johnson was also charged with 
being a persistent violator; and that, therefore, his conviction exposed him to upwards of 
a life sentence. (R., pp.48-50.) Because of the seriousness of the charges that 
Mr. Johnson was facing in this case, the district court was required to consider the 
adequacy of lesser sanctions prior to excluding completely Mr. Arterburn's testimony. 
The district court in this case failed entirely to balance the potential prejudice to 
the State - or inquire as to whether there would be any prejudice to the State - based 
upon the late disclosure of Mr. Arterburn as a potential witness against Mr. Johnson's 
constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense. Instead, the district court 
relied entirely on the lateness of this disclosure as the basis for excluding 
Mr. Arterburn's testimony. (Tr., p.255, L.12 - p.256, L.17.) The court also failed to 
consider whether there were any lesser sanctions that would be appropriate to address 
Common alternative sanctions are granting a short continuance so as to allow the 
State to interview the witness, declaring a mistrial, or imposing a fine against defense 
counsel. See, e.g., A/ber& 138 Idaho at 289, 62 P.3d at 213; State v. Thomas, 133 
ldaho 800,803,992 P.2d 795,798 (Ct. App. 1999). 
the discovery violation that were short of completely excluding the witness. In sum, the 
district court failed to follow clearly applicable legal standards in its determination to 
completely preclude Mr. Johnson from presenting the testimony of Mr. Aterburn in 
support of his defense. 
D. The District Court's Error in Excludinq Entirely The Testimony Of The Late 
Disclosed Witness Was Not Harmless 
Where error concerns evidence improperly excluded at trial, "the test is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the lack of the excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction." Harris, 132 Idaho at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. Relevant to 
consideration of this issue is whether the testimony that was excluded would have 
supported the account of events provided by the defendant in cases where credibility is 
of central concern. Id. at 847-848, 979 P.2d at 1205-1206. 
In this case, Mr. Johnson's defense was, in large measure, comprised of his 
version of events that was provided through his testimony of the circumstances 
surrounding his sale of copper wire. As such, his credibility was of paramount 
importance in this case. Mr. Arterburn was a disinterested witness who could have 
supported Mr. Johnson's version of events, and therefore his credibility. In particular, 
Mr. Arterburn would have testified that: (1) he personally observed the two rolls of wire 
behind Mr. Johnson's brother's house that Mr. Johnson testified was the source of the 
wire he had sold on two occasions; and (2) that the reason that Randy Aterburn's name 
appeared on one of the sales receipts was that Mr. Arterburn and Randy Arterburn gave 
Mr. Johnson their permission to use their account at Pacific Steel and Recycling to sell 
the copper wire. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9; p.254, Ls.10-23.) Defense counsel also specifically 
noted the importance of this testimony as it related to the degree to which the jury might 
give credence to Mr. Johnson's version of events. (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-17.) 
Beyond the inherent importance of Mr. Arterburn's testimony, the absence of this 
testimony becomes of even greater significance given the prosecutor's closing remarks 
in this case. The prosecutor took advantage of the district court's exclusion of 
Mr. Arterburn's testimony by casting doubt on exactly those facts provided in 
Mr. Johnson's testimony that Mr. Arterburn could have corroborated. Notably, the 
prosecutor said the following: 
[Mr. Johnson] also said that he was bringing [the wire] in on his own, but 
on the 2znd when he brought that wire in from the railroad he had 
someone, a Jason or I can't remember his name, but a brother of Randy 
Arterburn whose name appears on the receipt from the 22nd on the top 
left-hand corner. What's that all about? Well, you can conclude that (A), 
he just happened to pick his friend up who took him to Pacific Steel and 
Recycling and said, hey, put that on our account, that's okay you can say 
we told you that you could sell that property for us. 
So why would Lonnie Johnson happen to run over some railroad wire near 
the tracks and then take it in with his friend and then say he was selling it 
for his friend's brother? How does that make any sense? Maybe because 
he was frying to cover something up and make it look like it wasn't actually 
stolen property. 
(Tr., p.322, L.3-p.323, L.6.) 
Obviously, the jury in this case never heard anything at all from Mr. Arterburn, or 
even knew for certain that Mr. Arterburn really existed. Because the district court 
prevented Mr. Johnson from calling Mr. Arterburn as a witness, this provided an 
opportunity for the prosecutor in this case to imply that the presence of Mr. Arterburn's 
name on one of the receipts was somehow evidence of an attempt on Mr. Johnson's 
part to deceive the recycling center as to the source of the copper, rather than being 
merely an expediency for purposes of processing the copper sale. 
In addition, the prosecutor also attempted to cast doubt on Mr. Johnson's claim 
that he had found and sold copper wire present on his brother's property during the 
State's closing remarks. (Tr., p.323, L.14 - p.324, L.6.) Mr. Arterburn would have been 
able to testify, in corroboration of Mr. Johnson's testimony, that he had personally 
observed the rolls of copper wire on Mr. Johnson's brother's property. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4- 
9; p.254, Ls.10-23.) In a case where credibility was the sum and substance of the 
defense, exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony as corroboration of the defense version 
of events cannot be said to have been harmless. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error 
When She Referred To Mr. Johnson As A "Scavenaer" And A "Buzzard;" And When 
She Mischaracterized The Substance Of Mr. Johnson's Testimonv During Closinq 
Arquments 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor in this case committed prosecutorial 
misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor attempted to 
evoke the sympathies of the jury towards the railroad company, called Mr. Johnson 
names, and misstated the record of Mr. Johnson's testimony in this case. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Risina To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error When She Referred To Mr. Johnson As A "Scavenner" And A "Buzzard:" 
f
During Closinn Arguments 
As an initial matter, Mr. Johnson did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at 
issue in this case. "When there is no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be 
reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as 
to result in fundamental error." Sfafe v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 480 
(Ct. App. 2008). Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error 
when it is calculated to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury against the 
defendant or is otherwise so inflammatory as to create the potential that the jury may be 
influenced to determine guilt on factors outside of the evidence. Id; Sfafe v. Kuhn, 139 
ldaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003). However, in order to be deemed 
fundamental, the prosecutor's remarks, taken in the context of the entire closing 
argument, must be so egregious or inflammatory that a curative instruction to the jury 
would not have cured the prejudice. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. 
Here, there were two separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct, both of 
which rose to the level of a fundamental error. First, the prosecutor in this case 
attempted to engage the passion and prejudice of the jury, rather than arguing proper 
inferences from the evidence, when she attempted to engender the sympathy of the jury 
by portraying the railroad as a particularly vulnerable victim while simultaneously 
denigrating the defendant personally by calling him names. Second, the prosecutor 
misstated Mr. Johnson's testimony, and, in so doing, erroneously argued that he had 
admitted knowing the wire was stolen and was the railroad's property. 
While both parties are generally given considerable latitude in closing arguments, 
it is improper for a prosecutor to employ inflammatory words when describing the 
defendant during closing arguments. State v. Severson, - Idaho , P.3d -, 
2009 WL 1492659, *22 (2009).~ In particular, prosecutors as quasi-judicial officers 
"have a duty to ensure that defendants receive fair trials." Id. at *17. 
"Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory 
tactics are impermissible." Gross, 146 ldaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482. In this case, the 
prosecutor indisputably made such an appeal during closing arguments when she used 
derogatory language to describe the defendant and further attempted to engender and 
play on the jury's sympathies towards the railroad company as a "long celebrated 
industry" that is vulnerable because it is "in decline." (Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.8.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks: 
On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long celebrated 
industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of competition out 
there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats, planes, and most of all 
technology, but that doesn't make it okay for thieves to be targeting 
railroad property. Railroad lines are not for scavengers, and that is what 
the defendant is. He is a scavenger. He is a buzzard. He is picking off 
the bones of the railroad industry. 
(Tr., p.330, p.25-p.331, L.8.) 
The prosecutor in this case referred to Mr. Johnson personally as a predatory 
animal and further denigrated him by calling him a "scavenger." While attorneys 
commonly make use of analogies in order to help the jury understand the law or the 
arguments of the parties, there is clearly a limitation on the use of analogy or metaphor 
As of the date of the writing of this brief, the opinion in Severson has not yet been 
released for publication in the permanent law reports and is subject to revision or 
withdrawal. 
where such tactics overstep the bounds of permissible argument. The ldaho Supreme 
Court has recognized as much when the Court held that it is clearly improper for a 
prosecutor to refer to the defendant as a "murdering dog," and further condemned those 
statements. Sfate v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999). 
Similarly, ldaho courts have recognized that any argument that consists of calling the 
defendant names is improper. See, e.g., Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 716, 85 P.3d at 11 15. 
In addition, prosecutor's remarks that are designed entirely to evoke sympathy 
I 
for the victim, rather than discuss pertinent evidence regarding the issues at trial, are 
also improper. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 575-576, 181 P.3d 496, 501- 
502 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, the prosecutor's remarks about the celebrated nature of the 
railroad industry, and its current vulnerability due to its state of industrial decline, were in 
no way based on any evidence that was admitted at trial, nor are they relevant to the 
legal issues. The only purpose for such argument is to arouse and evoke the jury's 
sympathies. In context with the remarks calling Mr. Johnson a scavenging predator, 
these remarks were so inflammatory as to rise to the level of a fundamental error. 
The prosecutor in this case also misstated Mr. Johnson's testimony. The 
prosecutor asserted that Mr. Johnson had made admissions with regard to the wire at 
issue in this case that he "knew it was probably stolen," and further indicated that 
Mr. Johnson and an employee of the railroad, "both I.D. the third batch [of wire] that 
came in as Union Pacific Railroad wire." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-18, p.324, Ls.15-18.) In 
actuality, the admissions made by Mr. Johnson to Officer Milovanovic had to do with 
wire that was the subject of a different charge out of Lincoln County, and the substance 
of his admission was markedly different than was represented by the prosecutor in 
closing arguments. (Tr., p.158, L. I - p. 162, L.15.) Mr. Johnson merely told the officer 
that he knew it was wrong for him to have picked up the wire prior to being arrested, 
which was an ambiguous statement at best and certainly not an admission that he had 
specific knowledge that the wire was stolen. (Tr., p.162, Ls.9-15.) More important, 
however, is that Mr. Johnson was speaking of wire that was found in his possession 
after he had sold the wire at issue in the instant case; and so he had never made any 
admissions at all about the wire he had previously sold which formed the basis of his 
criminal charges. (Tr., p.159, L.18 - p.160, L.1.) 
Mr. Johnson also testified specifically that there was nothing that indicated to him 
that any of wire that was related to his charges at trial belonged to anybody, including 
the railroad. (Tr., p.299, L.23 - p.300, L.7.) "It is plainly improper for a party to present 
closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence." Beebe, 145 
ldaho at 575, 181 P.3d at 501. Because knowledge that the wire was stolen was an 
element of the charged offense, this misstatement of the evidence by the prosecutor 
created the false impression that the State had direct evidence in the form of a 
confession as to the element of Mr. Johnson's purported knowledge that the wire was 
stolen. See, e.g., State V. Jones, 125 ldaho 477, 489, 873 P.2d 122, 134 (1 994) (direct 
evidence includes confessions of the defendant). 
Moreover, the prosecutor's acts of misconduct during closing arguments were 
not harmless. Even where prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental 
error, "the conviction will not be reversed when that error is harmless." Severson, 2009 
VVL 1492659, "17. A prosecutor's remarks may be deemed harmless if the State 
presents such overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt such that that the 
likelihood that the remarks contributed to the verdict is minimal. Hairsfon, I33 Idaho at 
In this case, the State's evidence was circumstantial, and cannot be said to have 
been so overwhelming that there is not a likelihood that the prosecutor's improper 
remarks contributed to the verdict. The Washington Court of Appeals case of State v. 
Rivers is instructive on this point. Sfafe v. Rivers, 981 P.2d 16, 17-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999). The prosecutor in Rivers, as did the prosecutor in this case, played on the 
sympathy of the jury by first casting the victim as helpless due to his state of 
intoxication. Id. at 17. The prosecutor then cast Mr. Rivers and his cohorts as 
"predators .. they are nothing more than hyenas." Id. At a later point in closing 
argument, the prosecutor against likened the defendant to another predatory animal, 
calling him a "jackal." Id. The Rivers Court determined that these remarks were an 
improper appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury. Id. at 18. 
In reviewing whether this error was harmless, the Rivers Court determined that it 
was not. Specifically, the court held that: 
The defendant's case hinged on his and his witness' credibility. The 
prosecutor attacked his credibility in an inappropriate manner, instead of 
adhering to his responsibility to utilize appropriate evidence that relates to 
the elements of the crime to persuade the jury that the State has met its 
burden of proof. Instead of focusing the jury's attention properly to the 
elements of the crime and the State's burden of proof, the prosecutor 
resorted to ill-conceived rhetoric aimed squarely at the jury's passions. 
We do not know whether the State would have succeeded without this 
inappropriate argument. We do know that this highly inappropriate 
conduct undermined the integrity of the criminal justice process to such an 
extent that justice was not done below. 
Here, as in Rivers, Mr. Johnson's defense rested in large measure squarely on 
the shoulders of his credibility. The State's case was circumstantial, which made the 
credibility contest in this case even more central to the jury's verdict. In making 
improper arguments that impugned Mr. Johnson's character, and in misstating the 
substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony, the prosecutor resorted to improper and 
inflammatory tactics in order to induce the jury to reach a verdict outside of the proper 
bounds of the evidence in this case. The State also implied that there was an 
admission on the part of Mr. Johnson as to a critical element of the offense when, in 
fact, there was none. As such, the prosecutor's misconduct cannot be said to have 
been harmless. 
v. 
The District Court Erred When The Court Awarded Restitution In The Amount Of $2,000 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it awarded restitution in the amount of $2,000. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision as to whether to order restitution, and what amount of restitution to 
order, is within the district court's discretion. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280. 
"When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When The Court Awarded Restitution In The Amount Of 
$2.000 
"Restitution may only be awarded for actual economic loss suffered by the 
victim." Smith, 144 ldaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280 (citing I.C. $3 19-5304(1)(a), (2)). 
Valuation of property for purposes of restitution, as with valuation of property for 
purposes of determining the gradation of a theft offense, is determined according to the 
fair market value of the property as opposed to the cost of replacement. Id. 
As previously noted, the fair market value of the wires alleged to have been 
stolen was measured by the price that was paid by Pacific Steel and Recycling - 
$665.05. See Point I (C) supra. (See also Tr., p.242, Ls.3-4.) Because the district court 
awarded restitution in excess of the fair market value of the wire, the district court failed 
to follow the applicable legal standards attendant on its determination of restitution and 
thereby abused its discretion. 
VI. 
Proper Application Of The Cumulative Error Doctrine Reauires Reversal In This Case 
Finally, Mr. Johnson asserts that, even if the errors in this case are not deemed 
reversible when taken individually, in the aggregate, the errors in this case rose to the 
level of denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial. The doctrine of cumulative error requires the 
reversal of a conviction when there is, "an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show an absence of a fair 
trial, in contravention of the defendant's right to due process." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 
559, 572-573, 165 P.3d 273, 286-287 (2007). Given the number of errors occurring in 
this case, the cumulative effect of these errors operated to deprive Mr. Johnson of his 
right to a fair trial. As such, proper application of the cumulative error doctrine requires 
reversal in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentence and remand his case for entry of a judgment of conviction and 
sentence for misdemeanor theft. In the alternative, he requests that this Court reverse 
his judgment of conviction and sentence and remand his case for further proceedings. 
In the alternative, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's order of restitution and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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